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The distribution of wage-earner's life insurance is the process of establishing and
maintaining the legal relations of insurer and insured between the insurance carrier
and the persons who need or desire such insurance. Roughly speaking, it is the
selling of insurance. Analysis of the various distribution schemes which have thus
far been employed indicates that the distribution process may significantly be sub-
divided as follows: I. Solicitation and persuasion of the prospect. 2. Information
service, that is, the giving of reliable information as to the terms of the contract and
impartial guidance as to its adaptability to the needs of the prospect. 3- Underwrit-
ing service, including the selection of the risk (with or without medical examina-
tion), the taking of the application, the delivery of the policy, and the collection of
the first premium. 4. Collection of subsequent premiums. 5. Solicitation and per-
suasion of the insured to continue premium payments. With due apologies to those
readers who may, not unnaturally, have been misled into believing that the tide of
this article referred to the statistical distribution of policyholders among income
groups, occupation groups, age groups, population areas, etc., it may be pointed out
that an analogy is here suggested between the distribution of insurance and the
distribution of ordinary merchandise. Whereas the two are scarcely comparable
with respect to the production' process, i.e., the process of economically producing a
sound article, with respect to the distribution process one finds similar problems of
economy and efficiency which are far from being satisfactorily solved. The present
essay is intended to survey briefly some of the distribution problems of wage-earner's
life insurance.
Since the purpose is to analyze these problems in terms which are not confined to
any single institution (such as industrial life insurance, savings bank life insurance,
government insurance) it is necessary to define what is meant by wage-earner's life
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1 The term "production" is used by life insurance companies in a wholly different sense; that is, to
mean the selling of insurance, especially of new insurance.
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insurance. Historically, insurance means a scheme of risk-distribution whereby
persons exposed to similar risks receive payments, in case of loss, from a fund
derived solely from contributions made by the persons so exposed. In other words,
insurance is here taken to mean a completely self-sustaining, unsubsidized plan of
risk-distribution. To confuse profit-making with economic individualism is so easy
that one may be pardoned for pointing out that life insurance is, in the United States
today, typically not a profit-making business, but that it is individualistic in the sense
of being self-sustaining. Insistence upon this definition will serve to indicate clearly
when proposals for government insurance cease to be insurance and cross the line
from individualism to paternalism, philanthropy or charity.2
By life insurance is meant any contract to pay a named or ascertainable sum upon
the death of a person. Here the possibilities include term insurance in its various
forms, whole life insurance, limited payment life insurance, and endowment life
insurance, but not pure endowment contracts nor annuity contracts. Policies provid-
ing for accidental death benefits may be included, but weekly indemnity benefits,
whether payable only in case of accident, or in case of disability arising otherwise,
do not fall strictly within the scope of the topic, although closely related institu-
tionally.
The term "wage-earner" obviously refers to those persons falling in the lowest
income group. This may be taken to include, roughly speaking, all of those whose
annual income is below $2,0o. These persons, with their immediate families, con-
stitute fully seventy per cent of the population of the United States. If one excludes
farmers and others who are technically not wage-earners but entrepreneurs (a dis-
tinction of doubtful significance for the present purpose) and if one excludes further
those persons (and their dependents) who are not engaged in industrial occupations,
the percentage falls to about one-hal. 3 Exact figures are not, at this stage, important.
Obviously the problem is of sufficient magnitude to justify the thorough study which
the editor of this journal has sought to give it. It is important to understand what
the problem involves.
The question at issue might be limited to the most economical and effective
method of distributing insurance on the lives of wage-earners. This limitation would
bring out the social objectives of the study, which are presumably to determine how
the economic losses caused, to dependents and others, by the death of the wage-
earner, can best be covered by insurance. Yet this restriction of the problem would
exclude consideration of the large proportion of industrial insurance which is written
on the lives of children and of others who are dependents rather than wage-earners.
These policies, it is submitted, represent doubtful social values; yet they are paid for
2 Tested by this definition many of the proposals for unemployment insurance are not pure insurance,
but are combinations of insurance and unemployment relief. This is not meant to depreciate their social
value, but it does indicate the direction of social change.
'Dr. Maurice Taylor, to whom we are indebted for much valuable information and analysis of the
problem, estimates the potential purchasers of industrial life insurance at 62,000,000 in 193o. TAYLOR,
THE SOCIAL COST OF INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE (r933) 62 n.
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out of the wage-earner's income and presumably are what he (or she) wants. They
surely cannot be ignored in an analysis of insurance schemes functioning on the pre-
supposition of individualism. Individual incentives are unfortunately not identical
with social objectives. Here the problem bifurcates: i. What is the most economical
and effective method of giving the wage-earner the life insurance he wants? 2. What
is the most economical and effective method of getting him to take what he ought
to want?
The position here taken that the wage-earner's wants and his needs diverge to a
significant extent may be open to question. In the first place it may be argued that
such a conclusion implies a Pharisaical or paternalistic attitude toward the wage-
earner, who needs guidance from the more enlightened members of the community
(including especially the writer). But this objection is a specious one. Since insurance
has long been subject to regulation and control by the state, and since the state can
act, legitimately, only for social objectives, a proposal that the state do something,
or refrain from doing something, which will promote the social objectives of wage-
earner's life insurance is no more paternalistic or socialistic than is any other proposal
for state action (or inaction). Legislation affecting insurance of salaried workers
and of those in the higher income brackets has likewise been aimed at, and can be
justified only by, the attainment of social objectives. Even in the classical political
economy of Adam Smith, the entrepreneur is not an end in himself but merely a
means to satisfy the economic wants of society. This thesis is expanded in Ihering's
analysis of the legal order in terms of social levers, coercion and reward. It is true
that, with relief rolls growing and income taxes mounting, the more prosperous
portions of the community are moved by incentives of self-interest to make the wage-
earner thrifty and self-sustaining, but it is by no means impossible for enlightened
self-interest to further the social good.
A more serious objection to the position taken above is that the inferences, from
which it is concluded that wage-earners' wants differ from their needs, are based
upon the experience of industrial insurance carriers, and may therefore merely repre-
sent defects in their methods of distribution. Three factors of industrial experience
stand out: i. The large proportion of policies taken on the lives of children. About
thirty-seven per cent of the industrial policy-holders in i93o were under fifteen years
of age, and about twenty-seven per cent were under ten.4 2. The large proportion of
housewives whose lives are insured,5 as well as those who procure policies on the
lives of others. 6 3. The extent to which funeral expenses afford the chief incentive to
the procurement of the insurance, and absorb the greater part of the proceeds.7
From these facts one may conjecture the incentives which lead to the procurement
and maintenance of this insurance. Among them, it would seem, are fear of a
pauper burial, love of a fine funeral, and an innocent desire to gamble a little on the
" Id. at 56. 'See Id. at 41.
'1d. at 59. 'Ibid.
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lives of the young. These are quite normal human motives, but they do not promote
the social objective of protecting the wage-earner's dependents, any more than does
the large amount of insurance written on the lives of housewives.s To pay for in-
surance on the lives of dependents is not the most prudent use of the wage-earner's
limited funds. Individual incentives do not parallel social objectives&
Any proposal for an effective and widespread distribution of wage-earner's life
insurance must take account of these facts. Five different methods of distributing
wage-earner's life insurance have thus far been tried: i. Industrial life insurance sold
through paid solicitors. 2. Fraternal insurance sold through lodges, sometimes with
payment of compensation to solicitors. 3. Government insurance sold through post-
offices (England and Japan). 4. Savings bank life insurance (Massachusetts).
5. Group insurance sold through employers.9 It is not assumed that these five plans
are designed to reach the same persons, nor that any one method of distribution
would be most effective for all wage-earners.
In the United States industrial life insurance is the only one which has come near
blanketing its field. In terms of proportion of insured persons to the possible total
of policyholders it has been successful, and this success has been maintained relatively
better than in the case of ordinary life insurance, during the trying depression years.
As a mere feat of sales organization and salesmanship the amazing growth of this
business during the past thirty years excites admiration. Yet the price of success has
been appalling. The cost of solicitation and collection (including supervisors'
salaries), despite improved efficiency In methods1° and despite the absence of any
incentive to make profits," continues to absorb an inordinate proportion of the
premium income.' 2  In estimating the cost, one must not overlook the restricted
non-forfeiture values of industrial policies.' 3 Moreover, the industrial insurance
80of course the death of the housewife causes economic loss, in funeral expenses and in the loss of
her services, hence this insurance is not valueless.
'A sixth method, group insurance sold through labor unions, is described in the article by Mr. Hedges
in this issue, Labor's Interest in Group Insurance, infra, p. 94.
11 The percentage of premium income spent on commissions and salaries by companies doing business
in New York decreased from 29.6 in 1gx to 19.6 in 1931. (TAYLOR, op. cit. supra note 3, 175). In
Massachusetts a comparable percentage decreased from 30.99 in 1924 to 22.71 in 1933. (CAsNEI, MAS-
SACHUSETTS SAVINGS BANK LIFE INSURANCE, ig.)
The three largest companies, which do about 75 per cent of the total industrial business (TAYLOR,
op. cit. supra note 3, 420) are mutual companies. Of course, the manager's incentive to increase his own
compensation is not to be overlooked.
Inordinate when compared with the expense ratio of ordinary life insurance, which decreased from
14.1 to 12.8 (cf. TAYLOR, 10C. cit. supra note so) or when compared with that of Massachusetts Savings
Bank life insurance, which was 6.io per cent in 1924 and 5 per cent in 1933 (CASNER, IOC. Cit. supra
note so). Of course the higher rate of mortality among industrial policyholders partly accounts for the
higher premiums (MACLEAN, LIFE INSURANCE (2d ed. 1932) 358).
'Non-forfeiture benefits are those accruing to the policyholder when the insurance for the face
amount of the policy terminates due to non-payment of premiums. These benefits are: x. Extended term
insurance for the face amount, the term of which is based upon the amount of the premiums paid.
2. Paid-up insurance, unlimited as to term but reduced in amount. 3. Cash-surrender value. As a
general rule industrial policies provide for the first two in case og cessation of premium payments after
the policy has been in force three years, and for cash-surrender value only after ten years. (TAYLOR, op. cit.
supra 88, 91.) In ordinary life policies (excepting term) either of the three benefits is payable after two
or three years. (MACLEAN, op. cit. supra note 12, 1so).
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organization seems better adapted to get the policy sold than to keep it in force.
The striking lapse ratio in industrial insurance has long been a source of worry to
company officials; it persists in spite of the pressure exerted upon the local solic-
itors.14  Industrial life insurance has mounted, like the frog in the old arithmetic
problem, by jumping upward three feet and sliding backward two.1 5
To examine fully the merits and demerits of industrial life insurance is beyond
the scope of this article. The industrial companies have succeeded in persuading the
industrial wage-earner to buy insurance. They have only partially succeeded in
getting him to take the kind of insurance he needs most, or to take an amount of
insurance even moderately proportionate to the needs of his dependents in case of
his death. It is easy to conclude that this is due to faulty methods of distribution;
but it seems equally due to the intractability of the prospect. The assumption that
all men will act in accordance with enlightened self-interest is still only an assump-
tion.
Fraternal insurance offers the possibility of reducing distribution costs by luring
the prospect into the insurance trap through amateur solicitation, aided by social and
lodge features. Yet the relative decline of fraternal insurance during the period
when industrial insurance was growing rapidly, and also during the period when
fraternal societies were required by law to promise no more than they could perform,
indicates that its apparent success around the turn of the century was not based upon
a distribution plan which should be emulated. The phenomenal growth of fraternal
insurance during the last quarter of the nineteenth century was due more to unsound
rates than to superior methods of distribution.
In England the distribution of life insurance in small amounts through local post-
offices proved unsuccessful, and was abandoned after forty-three years. Here, as in
the case of the languishing Belgian experiment, the failure to attain effective distribu-
tion seems due to lack of salesmanship.'" Although in Japan government life
insurance, issued in small amounts through post-offices, has attained wide dis-
tribution, there seems no reason to believe that the wage-earning population of the
United States would be induced to procure life insurance from post-offices even if it
were made a government monopoly, as it is in Japan.17 The wage-earner can get
along without life insurance better than he can get along without postage stamps.
The postal savings banks, as agencies of distribution, could probably be adapted to
u By special compensation based upon the net weekly increase in the number of his policies in force,
TAYLOR, op. cit. supra note 3, 122.
" Of the various ways of exhibiting the extent of lapse for non-payment of premiums in industrial
insurance, the most striking is by presenting the ratio of lapsed policies to new policies written (in terms
of the amounts of insurance). The best year for industrial insurance was 1920, when the ratio was 49
per cent. In 1930, it was 76.1 per cent, and in 1932, 111.4 per cent. (A smaller percentage is obtained if
the total amount of insurance in force is taken as the base. See TAYLOR, op. cit. supra note 3, 140-142.)
In Massachusetts, the corresponding figures for industrial insurance were 74.9 per cent (930) and 107.45
per cent (1932) as compared with 1.20 per cent (1930) and 2.63 per cent (1932) for savings bank
policyholders.
' See TAYLOR, op. cit. supra note 3, 321-323.
271d. at 324.
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accomplish all the objectives of a sound distribution plan except that of bringing in
the customers. There is no reason to believe that they would be more successful
in quantity distribution than have been the savings banks of Massachusetts. More-
over, the constitutional power of the federal government to engage in such a project
seems highly questionable.
The Massachusetts Savings Bank Life Insurance plan has proved both sound
and economical. The policies are issued by savings banks, but are buttressed by a
guaranty fund which gives them the risk-spread of statewide operation. The policies
are sold through clerks in savings banks and trust companies (not all of which issue
policies) and to some extent through employers. No paid solicitors are employed,
and the percentage of premium used for expenses is far less than in the case of
industrial life insurance, or even of ordinary life. The rate of mortality is lower
than that among industrial policyholders, partly because a medical examination is
required.' 8 The lapse ratio is extremely low, showing that the insurance stays sold.
The wage-earner gets what he wants and, so far as one can tell, what he ought to
have. In many respects it is an ideal plan. And yet the question remains open
whether it will ever succeed in reaching a majority of those in the lower income
levels of the wage-earning population. The average policy in force under the Mas-
sachusetts plan is around $900, as compared with around $200 for the average indus-
trial policy.19 The total amount of insurance in force is only about one-tenth of the
amount of industrial life insurance in force, and the total number of policies is cor-
respondingly about two per cent of the total of industrial policies in Massachusetts.
The savings bank plan has been in operation twenty-five years and during the past
five years, at least, it has had good publicity. It has the influence of its illustrious
author, Mr. Justice Brandeis. It has been endorsed both by employers' associations
and by the American Federation of Labor and has the disinterested support of a
voluntary association. Two instructors are employed to visit factories and explain
the plan. Despite sound management and sound distribution methods it has failed
to reach a very large segment of the wage-earning population. What more can be
done?
The employer as an agency of distribution offers hopeful possibilities. The
expense of solicitation and persuasion, and of premium collection, can be kept low.
The employer has an interest in having the lives of his workers insured, and in
giving them sound guidance as to the protection which they need. The personnel
departments of large industrial concerns, already familiar with workmen's compensa-
tion insurance, can be adapted to give this guidance. Moreover, insurance through
the employer may reach hazardous occupations and low income groups not reached
by the Massachusetts plan. Yet it remains to be seen whether even the larger em-
ployers will voluntarily undertake this service for their employees, and whether the
s Only a small percentage of industrial policies are issued upon medical examination.
"Unfortunately, no figures are available, in either case, as to the average amount on each life insured;
but it seems a fair inference that industrial policyholders are in a lower income group.
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employees will cooperate.20 A statute requiring the employer to apply the check-off
to life insurance premiums would be of doubtful constitutionality since, unlike work-
men's compensation, the wage-earner's life insurance bears no necessary and direct
relation to industrial risks.
The conclusion to be drawn from this sketchy analysis of distribution agencies
may be that wage-earner's life insurance, as above defined, is socially necessary but
economically impossible. Having ventured so far in the r6le of the critic, one may
as well venture further in the role of the prophet. Industrial life insurance will con-
tinue as a going concern for some time to come. The managers of these enterprises
are not oblivious to their social responsibilities; and yet they cannot, in the face of
competition, make their insurance more effective to attain social objectives without
the aid of the state. Gresham's law, or a principle corresponding to it, operates in
the field of insurance much as it does in the field of currency. The history of insur-
ance legislation shows that it has been most effective where it drives out bad in-
surance in order that good insurance can thrive.21 Here too, legislation could curb
the 'excesses of salesmanship. For instance, a statutory prohibition of insurance on
the lives of children under ten would enable the industrial carriers to concentrate
upon satisfying the genuine needs of the wage-earner for life insurance. Again, the
abolition of weekly premium collections2 2 would surely reduce the expense ratio.
Yet an irreducible minimum of expense will remain, and industrial life insurance,
like other economic institutions, must yield ground to a less wasteful institution,
whenever an equally effective one appears. For this reason the extension of the
Massachusetts savings banks plan should be encouraged in all states which have both
an insurance department adequate to the task of supervision and savings banks able
and willing to take on this work. Its extension to other states must bd accompanied
by active propaganda if even a moderate success is to be attained.
The legitimate extension of wage-earners' life insurance will, it is believed,
eventually be limited by the amount which the wage-earning population will absorb
without the excessive distribution costs and the terrific lapse ratios which now prevail
in industrial insurance. That portion of the lower income group23 which can be
persuaded to take a pitifully inadequate amount of insurance only at an excessive
cost of persuading them to take it should be denied this luxury. They can better
be given economic security in the same manner as those who cannot afford any
insurance, namely, through a program of social relief. The distribution of wage-
earner's life insurance must be adjusted to this larger program, when it comes.
' A question too involved for discussion here. Group insurance has aroused labor opposition because
it penalizes the employee who quits.
' The writer has presented this thesis in the article Insurance Law and Regulation, 8 ENCYC. SoC. Sci.
(1932) xo6, 112.
" Such a statute could not impair the obligation of existing contracts; but in view of the high lapse
ratio, a statute operating prospectively would in a few years eliminate most of the weekly premium
contracts.
' E. g., the domestic servant group.
